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Some passages in First Amendment law have taken on a life 
and legend of their own, entering our cultural lexicon for their 
particular power, precision or passion. Some phrases are just so 
beautifully written that they cannot escape notice.3 Others aptly 
capture the essence of a key concept in a memorable way. Still 
others seemingly have grown in importance simply by the 
frequency for which they are cited in later court decisions. 
In his book, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best 
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Judges, Ross Guberman writes of “some of the most enduring 
passages in opinion-writing history.”4 Some of the most legendary 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes5 
and Robert Jackson,6 were wordsmiths who crafted time-honored 
passages. The following ten phrases from U.S. Supreme Court 
First Amendment decisions qualify as some of the most enduring 
passages in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
“FIXED STAR” 
Depending on if, when, and where you attended public 
school, you may have begun your days reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Perhaps this filled you with a sense of pride. Perhaps 
not. Perhaps you thought, “This seems a bit totalitarian.” 
Perhaps, like a proud patriot, you looked upon those cynical free 
thinkers with disgust. Whatever your reaction, it is worth 
remembering that the reactions of Americans in the World War 
II era led to two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette7 was the culmination of a battle between government 
and school officials who sought to enforce conformity and 
patriotism on the one hand and Jehovah Witnesses and their 
religious beliefs on the other. The West Virginia legislature 
required its schools to conduct courses in history, civics, and 
constitutional studies.8 West Virginia took this step with the 
express purpose of “teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the 
 
 4. ROSS GUBERMAN. POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S BEST 
JUDGES xxiii (2015). 
 5. Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative Guide to Neil 
Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 82 (2018) (listing 
Holmes as one of three justices with a “diverse vocabular[y]” and a justice 
“recognized for [his] narrative skill.”). 
 6. Gregory Chernak, The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 51, 57 n.26 (1999) 
(“Jackson was also one of the greatest writers to serve on the nation’s highest 
court.”); Charles Patrick Thomas, A New Deal Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored by Justice Robert Jackson, 44 J. LEGIS. 
132, 133 (2017)) (noting that “Jackson is probably best remembered as an 
impressive advocate and wordsmith.”). 
 7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 8. Id. at 624. 
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ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the 
knowledge of the organization and machinery of the 
government.”9 With the disastrous rise of socialism and fascism 
in Europe, it is easy to understand why American legislators felt 
compelled to inculcate strong national values in the American 
youth. But instead of filling them with American pride, some 
critics felt the expressly nationalist push in curriculum and—in 
particular—the recitation of the pledge of allegiance was 
inappropriately similar to tactics adopted by German leader 
Adolph Hitler (such as the Hitler Youth programs).10 
Among the chorus of disapproving voices, some of the most 
resolute protesters were Jehovah’s Witnesses.11 The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses based their opposition in biblical verses like Exodus 
20:4–5: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any 
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.”12 The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses felt the flag of the United States of America was one 
such “image,” and they believed it was a sin for their children to 
begin the school day saluting and pledging it their allegiance.13 
In the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ minds, this was tantamount to 
bowing themselves down. 
Barnette appeared before the Court just three years after the 
Court’s decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.14 In that 
decision, the Court upheld a Minersville, Pennsylvania public 
school practice of compelling students to salute the flag and 
pledge it their allegiance; in spite of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
protestations—and ruling during the uncertain World War II 
era—the Court reasoned the Minersville policy was a secular 
policy that furthered the legitimate goal of cultivating national 
unity.15 Justice Felix Frankfurter explained, “[w]hat the school 
authorities are really asserting is the right to awaken in the 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 627–28. 
 11. Id. at 629. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 15. Id. at 599–600. 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 15 
192 
child’s mind considerations as to the significance of the flag 
contrary to those implanted by the parent.”16 Only Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone dissented. After Gobitis, it was 
understandable that the West Virginia Board of Education in 
Barnette felt confident passing its own flag salute and pledge of 
allegiance policies in 1942. 
Nonetheless, the Jehovah’s Witnesses proved themselves 
stalwart in their continued fight against compelled speech. When 
the Jehovah’s Witness students refused to salute and pledge 
allegiance to the flag, West Virginia responded with measures as 
drastic as expulsion, relocation to reformatory schools (typically 
reserved for students with criminal inclinations), and prosecution 
of parents for causing their children to become delinquents.17 The 
Jehovah’s Witnesses brought suit, and, believing the Gobitis 
decision clearly supported its actions, the West Virginia Board of 
Education moved for dismissal.18 When the District Court 
refused dismissal, the Board of Education appealed directly to 
the United States Supreme Court.19 
Justice Jackson authored the Court’s eloquent opinion. First, 
he observed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses did not claim rights 
which would interfere with the rights of others, that the case 
involved neither violent nor disruptive behavior but peaceable 
refusal to engage in compulsory behavior, and that “the sole 
conflict [was] between authority and rights of the individual” 
before the State.20 Here, the Court faced the issue of the 
“compulsion of students to declare a belief.”21 Acknowledging the 
dynamic at play, Jackson then expounded upon the significance 
of the compulsion in question—he found it far from benign: 
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag 
salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but 
effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or 
flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, 
 
 16. Id. at 599. 
 17. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943). 
 18. Id. at 630. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 631. 
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is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political 
parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty 
of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The 
State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns 
and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks 
through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and 
clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas 
just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones. 
Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate 
gestures of acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared 
head, a bended knee.22 
Ultimately, the Court decided that the West Virginia Board 
of Education could not constitutionally compel students to 
participate in saluting and pledging the flag allegiance.23 Jackson 
looked to the enduring Bill of Rights axiom that “[o]ne’s right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”24 
Tracing and revivifying the First Amendment’s line in the sand, 
Justice Jackson closed his opinion (in part) with the epic passage: 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”25 
The Supreme Court has cited Jackson’s “fixed star” language 
in numerous decisions, including those involving compelled 
speech,26 political party free associational rights,27 flag-burning,28 
school prayer,29 library book censorship,30 political patronage,31 
 
 22. Id. at 642. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 638. 
 25. Id. at 642 (emphasis added). 
 26. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205, 220 
(2013). 
 27. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 616 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 28. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989). 
 29. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985). 
 30. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982). 
 31. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 n.9 (1980). 
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Communist Party cases,32 and bar applicant cases.33 All told, 
more than 250 judicial decisions have cited Justice Jackson’s 
famous “fixed star” passage. 
“SHOUTING FIRE” 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is widely considered, 
along with Justice Louis Brandeis, to be one of the fathers of the 
First Amendment.34 He authored many of the seminal decisions 
that explained why our country should protect freedom of speech. 
For example, he first used the terminology “clear and present 
danger” more than a hundred years ago to help draw the line 
between protected and unprotected speech in Schenck v. United 
States.35 
But, Holmes produced another phrase in his Schenck opinion 
that may be even better known, a phrase deeply enmeshed in our 
culture—”shouting fire in a theatre.” One scholar refers to it as 
“the most enduring analogy in constitutional law” that “has 
permeated popular discourse on the scope of individual rights.”36 
The case involved the prosecution of Charles T. Schenck and 
Elizabeth Baer for distributing leaflets urging people to refuse to 
comply with the draft. Schenck, the general secretary of the 
Socialist Party, opposed U.S. involvement in World War I and 
believed that conscription was akin to slavery.37 In the leaflets, 
Schenck and Baer mentioned the Thirteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution, which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude. 
In other words, the political dissidents believed that conscription 
into the armed forces amounted to a form of indentured 
servitude. The leaflets urged no violence and included the phrase 
 
 32. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 268 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs. of N. M., 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.15 (1957). 
 34. David Cole, Agon at Agura: Creative Misreadings in the First 
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1986) (referring to Holmes and 
Brandies “two strong fathers of the First Amendment”). 
 35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 247, 52 (1919). 
 36. Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in a Theater:” The Life and Times 
of Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
181, 181 (2015). 
 37. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. 
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“Assert Your Rights.”38 Nevertheless, Justice Holmes affirmed 
the convictions for a unanimous Supreme Court. He explained: 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within their constitutional rights. But the character 
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic. . . . The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature 
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. It is question of proximity and degree.39 
In this passage, Holmes explained that in times of war the 
government can place greater restrictions on freedom of speech. 
He also gave what scholar Stephen Feldman has identified as “a 
prototypical example of unprotected expression.”40 Frederick 
Schauer has called it “a ubiquitous weapon in the speech 
restrictor’s rhetorical arsenal.”41 
Holmes’ classic “fire in a theatre” is perhaps the most-often 
quoted phrase from First Amendment jurisprudence. It has 
transcended the Supreme Court Reports into the normal cultural 
sphere. For example, years ago when asked by a reporter why 
used uttered mean things about an opponent, former world 
heavyweight boxing champion “Iron” Mike Tyson responded: “It’s 
not like I yelled fire in a theater or something.”42 
Ironically, some of Holmes’ contemporaries and friends were 
not pleased either with Holmes’ opinion in Schenck or his 
“shouting fire in a theatre” language. For example, political 
 
 38. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51. 
 39. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 40. Stephen M. Feldmen, Free Speech, World War I, and Republican 
Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 208 
(2011). 
 41. Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language, in THE FREE 
SPEECH CENTURY 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019) 
 42. David L. Hudson, Jr., What a Phrase: “Falsely Shouting ‘Fire’ in a 
Theatre,” FREEDOM F. INST. (Dec. 11. 2019), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/12/11/what-a-phrase-falsely-
shouting-fire-in-a-theatre. 
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scientist Ernst Freund objected to the analogy of “shouting fire in 
a theatre” to speech by political dissidents.43 
Interestingly, many misquote Holmes’ passage by adding in 
the adjective “crowded” to make it “shouting fire in a crowded 
theatre.”44 For example, Justice William O. Douglas added the 
adjective “crowded” before theatre when speaking of Holmes’ 
favorite metaphor.45 Holmes never used the adjective “crowded.” 
Perhaps even more ominously, some omit the adverb “falsely” 
from Holmes’ famous phrase. Obviously, the First Amendment 
would protect a speaker who truthfully warns of a fire. 
The U.S. Supreme Court later cited Holmes’ shouting fire 
phrase in decisions involving alleged true threats,46 broadcast 
indecency,47 civil rights marching,48 prior restraints on public 
speakers,49 and noise control ordinances.50 More than 130 judicial 
opinions in all have cited Justice Holmes’ famous “shouting fire” 
passage. 
“MORE SPEECH, NOT ENFORCED SILENCE” 
One of the most important doctrines in First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the counter-speech doctrine—the idea that when 
confronted with harmful or wrongheaded speech, the best 
alternative is not censorship but counter speech.51 The doctrine is 
traced back to Justice Louis Brandeis’ concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California,52 involving the prosecution of Charlotte 
 
 43. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine, 50 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1205, 1282 (1983) (writing that Freund was 
“horrified” that Holmes would compare shouting fire in a theater to speech by 
political dissidents); Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 661, 682 (2012). 
 44. Larson, supra note 36, at 182. 
 45. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 444, 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 46. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S 886, 927 n.70 (1982). 
 47. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978). 
 48. Cox v. La., 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965). 
 49. Kunz v. N. Y., 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 50. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949). 
 51. David L. Hudson, Jr., More Speech, Not Enforced Silence, FREEDOM F. 
INST. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2020/02/07/more-
speech-not-enforced-silence [hereinafter Hudson, More Speech]. 
 52. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–81 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
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Anita Whitney under a California criminal syndicalism law. Her 
crime was assisting in facilitating a meeting of the Communist 
Labor Party in Oakland, California.53 
Whitney was the daughter of a former California state 
senator and the niece of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Field.54  A peaceful political activist, Whitney 
nevertheless was arrested and charged for violating the state’s 
criminal syndicalism law. She took her case all the way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed her conviction. 
However, Justice Louis Brandeis—joined by Justice 
Holmes—penned a memorable concurring opinion that scholar 
Vincent Blasi has called “the most important essay ever written, 
on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”55 
The concurring opinion reads like a dissenting opinion, causing 
scholars Ronald K.L. Collins and David Skover to call it a 
“curious concurrence.”56 They explain that Brandeis’ opinion in 
Whitney was a draft that he had originally written as a 
dissenting opinion in the case of Charles Ruthenburg, who died 
before the Supreme Court could issue an opinion.57 
Brandeis famously authored the following passage that 
stands for the counter-speech principle: “If there be time to 
expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert 
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”58 
Time and again over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court and 
many lower courts have invoked the counter-speech doctrine as 
the preferred First Amendment remedy. For example, in United 
States v. Alvarez,59 a case involving the federal prosecution of a 
 
concurring). 
 53. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372. 
 54. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: 
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 
656 (1988). 
 55. Id. at 668. 
 56. Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice 
Brandeis’ Opinion in Whitney v. California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 335 (2005). 
 57. Id. at 371. 
 58. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. 
 59. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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man who lied about receiving military medals, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote that “[t]he remedy for speech that is false is 
speech that is true.”60 
Many judges through the years have invoked the counter-
speech doctrine in First Amendment opinions. For example, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall—as ardent a defender of free speech 
who has ever sat on the High Court61—years earlier invoked the 
counter-speech doctrine in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township 
of Willingboro, invalidating a New Jersey municipal ordinance 
banning “for sale” signs in the midst of what city officials 
perceived to be white flight.62 Justice Marshall quoted Justice 
Brandeis’s famous passage in Whitney and added that the city 
could not ban the signs but could engage in the “processes of 
education” to promote integrated housing.63 
At times, it is most tempting to censor speech or to call for 
the censorship of speech we don’t like. But before engaging in 
those impulses, we should consider Justice Brandeis’s time-
honored message of “more speech, not enforced silence.”64 
“A PROFOUND NATIONAL COMMITMENT” 
The essence of the First Amendment is the ability of citizens 
to criticize the government. Justice William Brennan captured 
this concept memorably in the landmark libel decision New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan,65 when he wrote: 
Thus we consider this case against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
 
 60. Id. at 727. 
 61. David L. Hudson, Jr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Great Defender of 
First Amendment Free-Speech Rights for the Powerless, 2 HOW. HUM. & C. R. L. 
REV. 167 (2018). 
 62. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
 63. Id. at 97. 
 64. Hudson, More Speech, supra note 51. 
 65. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (emphasis added). 
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officials.66 
The case involved The New York Times publishing an 
editorial advertisement in March 1960 titled, “Heed Their Rising 
Voices.”67 The ad criticized “Southern violators” of the civil rights 
of African American students and accused these violators of a 
“wave of terror” against these civil rights protestors.68 Some of 
the ad focused on the mistreatment of students and civil rights 
leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in Montgomery, Ala.69 
The commissioner in charge of the police department, L.B. 
Sullivan, sued The New York Times in an Alabama state court for 
defamation even though he was not named in the advertisement. 
An all-white Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in 
damages—a verdict upheld by the Alabama state appellate 
courts.70 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed and 
issued a landmark First Amendment decision. The court noted 
that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations”71 and instead such laws “must be measured by 
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”72 The Court also 
noted that “erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free 
debate”73 and it would chill free speech to impose crushing 
liability for newspapers who made mistakes.74 
The Court proceeded to find that public officials who sue for 
libel, like L.B. Sullivan, must meet a high standard of proof. 
They must show that the publisher printed the statements 
knowing they were false or acted with “reckless disregard.” Such 
was born the “actual malice” standard.75 
The essence of the ruling in Times v. Sullivan is that citizens 
have a First Amendment right to criticize government officials. 
 
 66. Id. at 270. 
 67. Editorial, Heeding Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960. 
 68. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57. 
 69. Id. 257–58. 
 70. Id. 256. 
 71. Id. at 269. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 271. 
 74. Id. at 271–72. 
 75. Id. at 279–80. 
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This hallmark principle resonates throughout Justice Brennan’s 
opinion but perhaps most forcefully in his beautiful language 
that talks about a “profound national commitment,” “uninhibited, 
robust and wide open” debate” and “vehement, caustic and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”76 
The Supreme Court has cited Justice Brennan’s famous 
phrase many times in the subsequent years. In 2011, for 
example, Chief Justice John Roberts quoted the phrase in 
multiple First Amendment cases—two involving restrictions on 
campaign expenditures or contributions77 and another on a 
restriction on funeral protests.78 Various justices would quote the 
passage in subsequent defamation opinions.79 Still other 
decisions involving the free-speech rights of public employees 
refer to the “profound national commitment” to “robust” debate.80 
Court decisions on picketing also quoted Brennan’s famous 
words.81 All in all, more than 840 First Amendment decisions 
have cited Justice Brennan’s memorable language. 
“BEDROCK PRINCIPLE” 
Many people support free speech as an ideal but when 
confronted with the reality of ugly speech their commitment to 
free expression dissipates. The late great Nat Hentoff captured 
this censorial impulse in his book Free Speech for Me—But Not 
for Thee.82 
 
 76. David L. Hudson, Jr., ‘A Profound National Commitment’ to ‘Robust’ 
Debate, FREEDOM F. INST. (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/12/16/a-profound-national-
commitment-to-robust-debate. 
 77. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 
721, 755 (2011); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007). 
 78. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). 
 79. See, e.g., Harte Hank Comm’s v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 
(1989); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986). 
 80. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 162 (1983) (J. Brennan, dissenting); 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976). 
 81. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); Chicago Police Dept. v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
 82. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME—BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE 
AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992). 
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But the reality is that the First Amendment protects much 
speech that is obnoxious, offensive and repugnant. Justice 
William Brennan expressed this principle eloquently in his 
majority opinion in the flag-burning decision Texas v. Johnson.83 
Brennan wrote: 
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.84 
Gregory Johnson participated in a “Republican War Chest 
Tour” protest in Dallas, Texas—the site of the 1984 Republican 
National Convention.85 While Johnson doused the flag with 
kerosene, others chanted, “America, red, white and blue, we spit 
on you.”86 No one was physically harmed by the protest activities, 
but several witnesses were offended greatly by the burning of the 
flag.87 Authorities arrested only Johnson of all the protestors.88 
They charged him under a Texas law criminalizing the 
desecration of the American flag, a “venerated object.”89 
The Supreme Court narrowly ruled 5-4 in favor of Johnson. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan reasoned that the law 
was unconstitutional because it suppressed Johnson’s speech 
because of the offensiveness of his message.90 Justice Brennan 
explained that “[t]he way to preserve the flag’s special role is not 
to punish those who feel differently about these matters” and “to 
persuade them that they are wrong.”91 
The Supreme Court has quoted or paraphrased Justice 
Brennan’s “bedrock principle” quote many times in subsequent 
First Amendment decisions, including ones involving disparaging 
trademarks,92 funeral protests,93 cross-burning,94 art 
 
 83. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 84. Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 399. 
 86. Id. at 399. 
 87. Id. at 399. 
 88. Id. at 400. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 407–08. 
 91. Id. at 419. 
 92. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
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censorship,95 and anonymous campaign speech.96 Nearly 200 
other court decisions have quoted or paraphrased Justice 
Brennan’s “bedrock principle” language. 
A lasting legacy of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Texas v. 
Johnson is his “bedrock principle” phrase, which has become a 
cardinal First Amendment concept—that the First Amendment 
protects much offensive, obnoxious and even repugnant speech.97 
“ONE MAN’S VULGARITY IS ANOTHER’S LYRIC” 
“One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” is one of the more 
notable First Amendment phrases in history. Its author was 
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, a man who was not a left-
leaning liberal or supporter of offensive behavior. In fact, Harlan 
II—the grandson of his namesake known as “the Great 
Dissenter”—was often regarded as one of the most conservative 
members of the Warren Court.98 He was known primarily as a 
proponent of the doctrine of judicial restraint. However, during 
his last year on the bench, he issued a majority opinion in Cohen 
v. California,99 a rather remarkable First Amendment opinion 
involving vulgar expression on a jacket. 
The case began in April 1968, when Paul Robert Cohen wore 
a jacket to a Los Angeles County Courthouse bearing the words 
“Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courtroom.100 A police officer 
passed a note to the judge, asking that Cohen be held in 
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contempt for the message on his jacket.101 However, the judge 
refused to find Cohen in contempt.102 
The police officer then waited until Cohen left the courtroom 
and then arrested him in the lobby for breach of the peace.103 The 
state law prohibited “maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the 
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive 
conduct. . . .”104A Los Angeles Municipal Court judge found Cohen 
guilty and sentenced him to 30 days imprisonment.105 Cohen 
appealed his conviction, because—as he told one of the authors of 
this article—”I did not want to serve 30 days in jail.”106 
The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, finding that it 
was foreseeable that the offensive conduct of wearing a jacket 
with that message could lead someone to react with violence.107 
His attorneys appealed to the California Supreme Court, which 
declined to hear the case.108 
The last chance for young Mr. Cohen stood before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which now only takes less than 80 cases a year 
out of thousands of petitions. Surprisingly, the Court took the 
case and ruled in favor of Mr. Cohen by a slim 5-4 margin. 
Justice Harlan began his opinion by noting that “[t]his case may 
seem at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our 
books, but the issue it presents is of no small constitutional 
significance.”109 
The conservative Justice noted that the conviction rested 
upon the content of the words.110 The state argued that the words 
“Fuck the Draft” was a form of obscenity, an unprotected 
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category of expression in First Amendment law.111 Harlan 
rejected the notion that the jacket was legally obscene, writing 
that “such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.”112 
The state also argued that Cohen’s profane message 
amounted to fighting words, defined by the U.S. Supreme Court 
as “words which by their very utterance inflict injury or cause an 
immediate breach of the peace.”113 The Court had created the 
fighting words exception in Chaplinsky, a case involving a 
Jehovah Witness who had cursed at a local marshal.114 
But, Justice Harlan rejected the fighting-words argument, 
saying that the words were not directed at a specific individual. 
He explained: 
First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently 
boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other 
offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public 
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the 
most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable 
general principle exists for stopping short of that result were 
we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular 
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more 
distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless 
often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, 
we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot 
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution 
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.115 
This important passage—particularly the words “one man’s 
vulgarity is another’s lyric” —indicates that Justice Harlan 
recognized the eye-of-the-beholder aspect of offensiveness. What 
is offensive to one may not be offensive to another. What one 
person may consider highly offensive, another may consider a 
high form of art. Often, distasteful expression is in the eye of the 
beholder. As prolific First Amendment scholar Clay Calvert 
explains, the phrase is consonant with the modern void-for-
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vagueness doctrine.116 
Harlan’s phrase has found its way into other volumes of the 
United States Reports, most often in dissenting opinions. Justice 
Harry Blackmun, who dissented in Cohen, cited it with no great 
pleasure in his dissenting opinion in the fighting words decision 
Lewis v. New Orleans.117 Justice John Paul Stevens quoted the 
phrase in his partial dissenting opinion in the obscenity case 
Pope v. Illinois.118 Justice Sonia Sotomayor quoted Harlan’s 
famous phrase in her separate concurring in part and dissenting 
in part opinion in the vulgar trademark decision Iancu v. 
Brunetti.119 
Many lower courts cited the phrase in finding that profanity 
by itself does not equate to fighting words.120 Suffice it to say, the 
Cohen case has been cited countless times in judicial opinions, 
many times specifically for Harlan’s wondrous little phrase. 
“One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” captures the essence 
of freedom and the First Amendment. In the words of Cohen 
himself, “the government shouldn’t be able to decide what speech 
an individual can or cannot speak[.]”121 
“WE ARE A RELIGIOUS PEOPLE WHOSE INSTITUTIONS 
PRESUPPOSE A SUPREME BEING” 
Justice William O. Douglas wrote this famous phrase in 
Zorach v. Clauson,122 a case involving a New York student 
release program that allowed students to leave class—and 
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campus—to attend religious education. In Zorach, unlike 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,123 no public-school classrooms were 
utilized and all costs relating to these programs were borne by 
the religious organizations involved.124 New York taxpayers who 
disapproved of the program raised Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clause challenges against the program.125 
Declining to engage in judicial legislation by ruling on the 
wisdom of the program, the majority explained the real issue was 
“whether New York . . . either prohibited the ‘free exercise’ of 
religion or . . . made a law ‘respecting an establishment of 
religion’ within the meaning of the First Amendment.”126 In so 
doing, the Court weighed the upholding of the Establishment 
Clause against the integral importance religion played in both 
the founding and the continuing existence of the United States.127 
While “[t]here is much talk of separation of Church and State in 
the history of the Bill of Rights and in the decisions clustering 
around the First Amendment,”128 it is simultaneously true that 
the First Amendment “does not say that in every and all respects 
there shall be a separation of Church and State.”129 Justice 
Douglas artfully wrote: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one 
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and 
creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We 
sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no 
partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish 
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its 
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dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule 
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our 
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our 
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual 
needs.130 
Douglas’s language has been cited in numerous landmark 
freedom of religion cases. In Marsh v. Chambers, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger cited Douglas’ language in ruling constitutional 
Nebraska’s practice of opening its legislative days with prayer by 
a state-paid chaplain.131 Burger found particularly significant the 
“unbroken practice for two centuries in the National Congress 
and for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other 
states.”132 The next year, in Lynch v. Donnelly, Burger cited the 
phrase again in his opinion upholding the constitutionality of a 
Nativity crèche in a municipality’s annual Christmas display.133 
More recently, the Court cited Douglas’ famous phrase in 
Van Orden v. Perry, a decision involving an Establishment 
Clause challenge to a Ten Commandments monument in a Texas 
public park.134 Thomas Van Orden, an offended observer raised 
an Establishment Clause challenge to the monument which had 
been in place for decades.135 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
observed: “Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet 
these institutions must not press religious observances upon 
their citizens.”136 In Van Orden, that the monument was a part of 
a long tradition of observing the presupposition of a Supreme 
Being—coupled with its definitively passive, non-oppressive 
nature—was enough to defeat the Establishment Clause 
challenge.137 
Justice Douglas’ words have found their way into numerous 
lower court opinions as well. Among the words’ most bold 
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invocations is their inclusion in a 2019 Third Circuit opinion 
upholding a Pennsylvania House of Representatives policy 
limiting its pre-legislative session prayers to theists only.138 
Judge Thomas L. Ambro further underscored the significance of 
the presumption of a Supreme Being by pointing to the then-
recent words of Justice Samuel Alito: “prayer is by definition 
religious.”139 The presupposition of a Supreme Being is a 
component of American cultural, governmental, and judicial 
history that has found and will likely continue to find its way 
into state and federal opinions at all levels. 
“OUR WHOLE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE REBELS AT 
THE THOUGHT OF GIVING GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO 
CONTROL MEN’S MINDS” 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote this famous sentence in 
Stanley v. Georgia, a case involving the execution of a search 
warrant by federal and state officers upon the residence of a 
Georgia man suspected of illegal bookmaking.140 While “very 
little evidence of bookmaking activity” was found, the officers 
discovered several reels of eight-millimeter film containing 
obscene material.141 The officers arrested the man, and he was 
subsequently convicted of violating a Georgia law prohibiting the 
possession of “obscene matter.”142 
Of the defendant’s several challenges to his conviction, the 
Supreme Court only found it necessary to discuss one: “[I]nsofar 
as [Georgia] punishes mere private possession of obscene matter, 
[the State] violates the First Amendment.”143 Writing on behalf of 
the Court, Justice Marshall wrote: 
[The convicted Georgia man] is asserting the right to read or 
observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual 
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is 
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asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the 
contents of his library. . . .Whatever may be the justifications 
for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they 
reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First 
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what 
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole 
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving 
government the power to control men’s minds.144 
Stanley set the precedent that “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene 
material a crime.”145 Justice John Paul Stevens loved Marshall’s 
words, citing it in not only a later obscenity decision146—but also 
in cases involving abortion147 and the drugging of inmates.148 
More than 50 subsequent decisions have cited the passage. 
“THE HUMAN SPIRIT” 
Justice Marshall—ever the eloquent First Amendment 
defender149—waxed eloquently about the importance of freedom 
of expression a few years after Stanley v. Georgia in a case 
involving prison inmates. Procunier v Martinez involved 
California Department of Corrections’ rules limiting inmate 
correspondence.150 Under the restrictive rules, inmates could not 
write letters in which they “unduly complained,” “magnified 
grievances,” or “express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, 
religious or other views or beliefs.”151 
The Court ruled against the rules, writing that prison 
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officials “failed to show that these broad restrictions on prisoner 
mail were in any way necessary to the furtherance of a 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
expression.”152 
Justice Marshall concurred but went further in his separate 
opinion, reasoning that prison officials should not be able to read 
inmate mail.153 He then explained in beautiful language why the 
First Amendment was important to prisoners who are shut off 
from the rest of the world: 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, 
but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression. Such expression is an integral part of the 
development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress 
expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition 
and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.154 
He further explained that prisoners need a “medium for self-
expression” and that the First Amendment satisfies the 
yearnings of the human spirit.155 
The Court’s opinion in Procunier v. Martinez represented the 
Court’s “high water mark” for protecting prisoner rights.156 
Unfortunately, the waters have receded since then, as the Court 
has gradually lowered the standard of review for prisoner 
regulations and sanctioned more and more forms of censorship.157 
“UNDIFFERENTIATED FEAR” 
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled that public 
school students possess First Amendment free-speech rights and 
that they don’t “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
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speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”158 School officials 
in Des Moines, Iowa, banned students from wearing black peace 
armbands for fear that the armbands might arouse feelings and 
lead to possible problems at school. But, Justice Abe Fortas, 
memorably wrote: “[b]ut, in our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right 
to freedom of expression.”159 He explained that school officials 
needed to show that the student expression would cause a 
substantial disruption of school activities in order to censor the 
student expression.160 
Justice Fortas’ language of “undifferentiated fear” not 
outweighing the freedom of expression appropriately recognizes 
the value of freedom of expression and that school officials must 
be able to point to actual evidence of disruption or at the very 
least a reasonable forecast of disruption rather than a 
generalized fear or speculation. 
The Court has used the phrase in a variety of First 
Amendment cases other than school cases, including profanity 
and fighting words161 and picketing.162 Justice Brennan quoted 
the phrase in dissenting opinions involving obscenity163 and 
public employee speech.164 Approximately, 350 First Amendment 
decisions have quoted Justice Fortas’ famous warning about 
“undifferentiated fear” from Tinker. 
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